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A Game Theory Approach to 
Railroad-Shipper Negotiations
Game theory provides a framework for analyzing problems when there are a small group of 
participants. This is unlike the economic model of perfect competition, which requires several 
participants. Game theory began as a way to analyze parlor card games, but has developed into 
a rigorous analytical technique for evaluating strategic interactions. These interactions could be 
between hostile countries, competing companies, or between a shipper and railroad.  In fact, game 
theory provides a useful structure for analyzing the interactions between a shipper and a railroad. 
This paper models such interactions.
by William Huneke
INTRODUCTION
To frame a problem in game theory terms, the 
strategies each player might employ must be 
considered.  There is also a need to determine 
the sequence of play: whether the players 
interact simultaneously or whether one player 
moves first and the other reacts.  Finally, payoffs 
each player receives from the interaction of 
those strategies must be calculated to identify 
the likely outcome. 
Many railroad markets are oligopolistic and 
economists have used non-cooperative game 
theory as a tool to model such competition, 
including Jean Tirole (1989), Dixit and 
Skeath (1999), and Dutta (2000).  However, 
the model presented in this paper is not based 
on oligopolistic competition.  This paper 
models the interaction of a monopoly railroad 
and a captive shipper (i.e., a shipper with no 
competitive or even oligopolistic options). 
The railroad monopolist is also assumed to be 
pricing to maximize its net income from this 
service.
There have been several papers that have 
applied game theory to regulatory settings.  The 
problem of access pricing in telecommunications 
has been studied in several papers, notably 
Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996), Curien, 
Julien and Rey (1998), and Laffont and Tirole 
(1994). These papers have sought to discover 
a better regulatory pricing paradigm.  Another 
approach has been to model a regulatory 
agency’s interaction with the regulated firm, for 
example, Baron and Besanko (1984), Laffont 
and Martimort (1999), and Laffont and Tirole 
(1986).  Finally, Laffont and Tirole (1991) used 
game theory to study the notion of regulatory 
capture.
This paper does not model the strategic 
interaction between the regulated firm and the 
regulator, nor does it seek to discover a better 
regulatory pricing paradigm.  Instead, it focuses 
on the negotiation between the regulated firm 
and its customer and models this negotiation 
as a strategic game.  The regulatory agency’s 
existence provides the customer with a strategic 
option to litigate the offered rate before the 
agency.  The paper also assumes the current 
statutory and regulatory framework from 
which the Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
operates.  It is important to understand shipper-
railroad negotiations given the wide latitude for 
price negotiation provided by the Staggers Act 
of 1980.
The issue to be analyzed is the strategic 
interaction between a railroad and a shipper. 
The railroad provides services that the shipper 
uses for input to its production.  The shipper 
has alternatives for some of the railroad’s 
services, which could be other modes or even 
other railroads.  However, there are many 
instances when there are no alternatives.  This 
creates market power for the railroad and has 
precipitated the implementation of railroad 
regulation.
The railroad industry exhibits high 
threshold and fixed costs.  This means it exhibits 
Railroad-Shipper Negotiations
0
economies of scale, scope and density at high 
volume levels.  Since passage of the Staggers 
Act in 1980, the industry has been adjusting its 
capacity to meet industry demand.  That means 
that many markets are served by railroads that 
have achieved optimal scale, meaning the 
railroads have exhausted economies and exhibit 
constant returns.  Because railroads have high 
threshold costs, entry costs are a barrier.  This 
paper allows the shipper to seek entry by 
another railroad at a cost of a $25 million build-
out, which is a figure within the range of a short 
build-out.  The effect of doubling this figure is 
also considered.
This paper models the railroad-shipper 
interaction as a game with two players.  The 
railroad moves first and has two strategies: price 
to avoid litigation or price to maximize profits. 
In this paper, the railroad’s ability to short-run 
profit maximize is limited by the shipper’s 
ability to access a competitive alternative 
through a competitive build-out.
In response, the shipper has three 
strategies:
1. Accept the railroad’s offered price 
2. Invest (build-out) to achieve access to 
the nearest competing railroad and gain a 
competitive price
3. Litigate the offered price at the regulatory 
agency (Surface Transportation Board).
As a simplification, this paper assumes that 
if the shipper accepts the railroad’s rate, the 
shipper will sign a contract that locks in that 
price for a fixed term.  A build-out requires 
the shipper to accept the offered rate for the 
duration of construction.  However, once the 
build-out is complete, competition between 
the railroads will drive rates down to marginal 
cost.  Litigation requires the regulatory agency 
to determine if the offered rate exceeds a rate 
reasonableness standard.  
This paper develops a model of this type 
of regulatory interaction.  The model provides 
a tool to analyze the decisions of two parties. 
The railroad aims to maximize its profits.  The 
shipper wants to minimize its costs.  The railroad 
offers a rate and then the shipper chooses 
to either accept the price, build-out to gain 
competitive entry, or litigate at the regulatory 
agency.  The model is used to analyze a series 
of different cost assumptions on each strategy.
THE GAME 
In this instance the game is the strategic 
interaction between a railroad and a shipper. The 
railroad provides transportation services, and 
the shipper purchases transportation services 
to move a load from an origin to a destination. 
This paper hypothesizes that the shipper is 
moving coal from a mine to a power plant. 
Some shippers have numerous alternatives, 
such as truck carriage, water transport, or even 
other railroads.  However, there are many times 
when neither the origin nor destination has 
an economic alternative to rail service.  This 
creates market power for the railroad, which is 
the premise for the implementation of railroad 
regulation in the United States. 
This paper hypothesizes that the railroad 
has two basic strategies: price to maximize 
profits or price to avoid litigation.  Consider first 
the profit maximizing strategy.  If the shipper’s 
only competitive alternative is a build-out to 
another railroad, the railroad will charge a rate 
just below the level that gives the shipper the 
incentive to build-out to another railroad.  The 
paper assumes this rate is 5% less than the rate 
at which the shipper is indifferent to a build-
out.   On the other hand, if the railroad wants 
to avoid litigation, it must set its rate below 
what it estimates the STB will determine to be 
the regulatory rate ceiling.  As a simplification, 
this paper assumes the STB will find that the 
regulatory rate ceiling to be 180% of URCS, the 
Uniform Railroad Costing System, which is the 
Board’s program for variable costs of a railroad 
movement.  U.S. law 49 U.S.C. 10707(d)(1)(A) 
limits the Board’s ability to prescribe rates less 
than 180% of URCS cost.  The Board could 
find during litigation that a challenged rate 
exceeded Stand Alone Cost (SAC), which was 
higher than 180% of URCS variable cost.  For 
simplicity, this paper ignores that possibility.  
This paper assumes the railroad will offer 
a rate that is 5% below the regulatory ceiling 
to clearly signal to the shipper that the railroad 
wants to avoid litigation.  To complete the 
game’s structure, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the railroad moves first.  It offers a rate and 
the shipper reacts.  To complete the analysis, the 
model must include an estimate of the payoffs 
for each of the game’s six possible outcomes. 
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THE MODEL 
The game’s six payoffs are:
• Parties contract at the railroad’s profit 
maximizing (PM) rate
• Parties contract at the railroad’s litigation 
avoidance (LA) rate
• Railroad offers PM rate, and shipper builds 
out to another railroad
• Railroad offers LA rate, and shipper builds 
out to another railroad
• Railroad offers PM rate, and shipper 
litigates
• Railroad offers LA rate, and shipper 
litigates
In each calculation marginal cost is 
subtracted from the revenues that change 
hands.  This paper assumes that marginal cost 
is the proxy for the incremental economic costs 
of providing the service.  Any costs beyond 
marginal costs, such as build-out construction 
costs or litigation costs, will be added or 
subtracted as appropriate.  Litigation costs occur 
in the first year and are not discounted.  Because 
the build-out costs are assumed to occur over a 
two-year period, the second year is discounted. 
The calculations will show payoffs in terms of 
shipper costs or railroad net income from this 
service.  The calculations are described first and 
then the actual equations are presented.
Calculations 
PM Rate:  The rate the railroad can charge to 
make a positive net income from this service but 
still deter a build-out is determined first.  This 
requires calculating a rate that produces railroad 
net income that is less than the shipper’s costs 
of a build-out. These are calculated as present 
values.
Contract & PM Rate: From society’s 
standpoint this outcome has modest appeal.  It 
avoids third party intervention that necessarily 
occurs in either a build-out or litigation.  For 
one thing, a build-out requires more regulatory 
intervention in the form of an environmental 
analysis by the STB.    The cost payoff to the 
shipper is the present value of revenues paid 
above marginal cost summed over the contract’s 
term.  This case is simply an income transfer so 
the railroad’s increased net income from this 
service equals the shipper’s costs.
Contract & LA Rate: This outcome has 
a bit more societal appeal because it avoids 
third party intervention and yet yields a lower 
rate to the shipper, a rate closer to incremental 
economic costs.  The calculation is the same as 
the previous case, although the rate and revenues 
will be different.   The cost payoff to the shipper 
is the present value of revenues paid above 
marginal cost summed over the contract’s term. 
This case is also simply an income transfer so 
the railroad’s positive net income equals the 
shipper’s costs.
Build-out & LA Rate: This is a bad outcome 
for the railroad.  Generally the LA rate will be 
below the PM rate, but the railroad still faces 
increased competition due to the build-out. 
The railroad earns just the present value of the 
net income during the build-out period.  After 
that, competition drives rates to marginal cost. 
This is a reasonable assumption based upon 
the railroad industry’s optimized unit train coal 
service (i.e., a homogeneous service at most 
efficient scale). Also, Grimm and Winston 
(2000, p. 65) found that captive shippers pay 
freight rates that are 21% higher than those 
paid by non-captive shippers.  Thus, the intra-
railroad competition resulting from the build-
out will push rates toward marginal cost.  The 
shipper’s costs are the railroad’s net income 
from this service during the build-out period 
plus the costs of the build-out.
Build-out & PM Rate: The calculation here 
is similar to the previous outcome except that 
the railroad’s net income from this service is 
based on the PM rate instead of the LA rate.
Litigate & PM Rate: In this outcome it 
is assumed that the shipper wins the litigation 
case and the STB prescribes a rate. Because 
the lowest rate the STB can prescribe is 180% 
of URCS variable cost, for purposes of this 
analysis we will make a further simplifying 
assumption that the prescribed rate equals 
180%.  (It is possible that the STB would set the 
rate at SAC, but assuming that the STB simply 
sets the rate at the regulatory threshold makes 
the analysis tractable and makes this option 
more favorable to the shipper.)  For simplicity 
it is also assumed that marginal cost and URCS 
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variable cost are equal.  While URCS estimates 
do not necessarily represent marginal economic 
costs, they are plausible estimates of average 
variable costs.  Average variable costs would 
equal marginal costs if the railroad had achieved 
optimal scale.  The prescribed rate holds for the 
entire period under consideration because the 
railroad will pay the shipper the present value of 
any overcharges.  The railroad’s payoff is its net 
income from this service, which is the present 
value of the capped revenues minus marginal 
cost during the period, further reduced by the 
litigation expenses.  The shipper’s payoff is the 
railroad’s economic costs plus the shipper’s 
litigation expenses. 
Litigate & LA Rate: For this outcome it 
is assumed that the railroad wins the litigation 
and the Board finds the rate reasonable.  This 
payoff is similar to Contract & LA rate except 
litigation expenses are added to shipper costs 
and deducted from railroad profits.
The variables used in the payoff equations 
are defined as follows:
C Cost of build-out to another railroad
PMR Profit maximizing rate, LP*0.95
F Litigation expense for shipper
LAR Litigation avoidance rate
H Litigation expense for railroad
i Interest rate
LP Limit Price, rate that makes shipper 
indifferent to building out
MC Long run marginal cost
m Number of periods of build-out 
construction
n Contract length in years
RM Regulatory markup over MC (80%)
S Shipment size
Equations 
(1) To calculate LP:
               
Calculations of Shipper Costs: 
Event:   Equation:
(2) Contract at LAR
(3) Contract at PMR
(4) Build-out & LAR
(5) Build-out & PMR
(6) Litigate & LAR
(7) Litigate & PMR
Calculations of Railroad Net Income from 
This Service: 
Event:   Equation:
(8) Contract at LAR
(9) Contract at PMR
(10) Build-out & LAR
(11) Build-out & PMR
(12) Litigate & LAR
(13) Litigate & PMR
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Base Case 
To estimate the model, some assumptions are 
made for the parameter values faced by each 
player. These assumptions are based upon 
the author’s experience analyzing rate cases 
at the STB. These assumptions are not drawn 
from any specific case and are meant to be 
illustrative. After the results are calculated, they 
are analyzed using a decision tree. The decision 
tree will start with the railroad’s move followed 
by branches for each of the shipper’s reactions. 
Each branch will have a payoff for the railroad 
and shipper.
This paper assumes that the railroad will 
employ a maximin approach.  When the railroad 
considers its first move, it will also consider 
what will be the shipper’s likely reaction.  The 
shipper’s payoffs are costs, which the shipper 
will want to minimize. The railroad will 
consider as a result of its choice which branch 
has the lowest cost for the shipper and will 
choose accordingly.
Here are the base case assumptions:
Build-out cost (C) $25 million
Build-out period (m) 2 years
Contract term (n) 5 years
Shipment size (S) 1 million tons
PM rate (calculated) $19.53/ton
Shipper litigation expense (F) $4 million
Railroad litigation expense (H) $4 million
Interest rate (i) 10%
Marginal cost (MC) $10 per ton
Figure 1 shows the decision tree populated 
with the results from calculations from inserting 
the base case numbers into the shipper and 
railroad equations.  The payoffs are in millions 
of dollars.  When the railroad reviews its option 
to charge an LAR (litigation avoidance rate), 
it sees that the shipper will choose to contract 
because that’s the lowest shipper cost of the 
three outcomes.  This outcome means $30 
million in net income from this service to the 
railroad.  If the railroad were to charge a PM 
rate, then the shipper will choose to litigate. 
This outcome means $29 million in net income 
Build-out (S: 37, RR: 14)
Litigate (S: 35, RR: 27)
Contract (S: 40, RR: 40)
Build-out (S: 43, RR: 18)
Contract (S: 30, RR: 30)
Litigate (S: 37, RR: 29)
Railroad choice Shipper choice
LAR
PMR
Figure 1: Base Case Decision Tree
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from this service to the railroad.  The railroad 
chooses to set an LAR rate and the outcome is 
a contract.  
EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
To extend the model, a few of the base case 
assumptions are altered.  This also allows some 
analysis of how changing various parameters 
might affect railroad and shipper decisions 
to contract, litigate, or build-out. The first 
assumption to adjust is shipment size, which 
will be doubled, while keeping all other base 
case values unchanged (Figure 2).
Double the Shipment Size 
When the shipment size is doubled, there are 
obviously more tons. Two million tons is now 
substituted in Equation 1. Because there are 
more tons, the PMR falls to $14.51/ton.  This 
rate is below the assumed regulatory ceiling of 
180% of variable cost or $18.00/ton so litigation 
would fail.  If the railroad tried to charge more 
than $15.28 (where the shipper is indifferent 
to a build-out), the shipper would build-out.1 
(See Appendix for calculation of both $14.51 
and $15.28.) The LAR is above $15.28 so the 
shipper would choose to build out, which leaves 
railroad net income at $27 million.  Seeing that 
result, the railroad offers PMR and the party’s 
contract, resulting in $37 million for both 
parties (Figure 3).
Double Build-out Cost from $25 Million to 
$50 Million  
Increasing the cost of the build-out is equivalent 
to making the shipper more dependent on the 
railroad (i.e., “more captive”).  In this extension 
it is still assumed that the shipment size is two 
million tons. The LA rate is below 180% of 
variable cost because the railroad is signaling 
its intention to avoid litigation by offering a 
rate that is 95% of the regulatory threshold. The 
railroad selects PMR and the shipper chooses 
to litigate because the difference between a 
rate at 180% of variable cost that would be 
set by the Board during litigation and the LA 
rate compensates the railroad for litigation 
expenses.
A More Aggressive Pricing Policy
Consider what happens if the railroad takes 
a more aggressive stance. Instead of clearly 
setting its rate below the regulatory threshold, 
the railroad priced above the regulatory 
threshold, but just below the point where the 
shipper would do better by bringing a rate case 
to the STB. This becomes true up to rate of 
$18.95/ton. Figure 4 shows what the payoffs to 
the shipper and railroad would be now.
The railroad chooses the branch that yields 
it a payoff of $37 million.
Regulatory Agency Perceived As Arbitrary
If the regulatory agency is perceived as arbitrary, 
the parties perceive that the agency may find an 
“unreasonable” rate to be “reasonable” and vice 
versa.  For example, the parties could perceive 
that the agency might incorrectly set a rate 
below the statutory threshold.  This is captured 
by a new term, IRM.  This paper assumes IRM is 
75% of the regulatory threshold and represents 
a rate ceiling of 136% of URCS variable costs 
instead of 180%.  The shipper could anticipate 
possible gains if it perceives the agency might 
set a rate at 136% of the regulatory threshold. 
On the other hand, the railroad would perceive 
possible gains if it thought it could achieve 
profit gains from “unreasonable” rates being 
found “reasonable.” To model a situation in 
which the parties perceive agency decisions as 
arbitrary, we need to alter the four equations that 
calculate payoffs to litigation. We add a new 
factor “p”, defined as the probability that the 
agency makes a rational decision (i.e., sets the 
rate ceiling at 180% of URCS variable costs). 
In previous examples this “p” is assumed equal 
to one.  In the discussion that follows “p” is 
equal to 0.5.  The new equations are:
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Figure 2: Decision Tree When Shipment Size Doubles
Build-out (S: 51, RR: 27)
Litigate (S: 63, RR: 55)
Contract (S: 37, RR: 37)
Build-out (S: 42, RR: 17)
Contract (S: 59, RR: 59)
Litigate (S: 71, RR: 63)
Railroad choice Shipper choice
LAR
PMR
Build-out (S: 86, RR: 36)
Litigate (S: 71, RR: 63)
Contract (S: 59, RR: 59)
Build-out (S: 75, RR: 27)
Contract (S: 79, RR: 79)
Litigate (S: 63, RR: 55)
Railroad choice Shipper choice
LAR
PMR
Figure 3: Decision Tree When Build-out is Doubled to $50 Million
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Build-out (S: 41, RR: 17)
Litigate (S: 41, RR: 33)
Contract (S: 40, RR: 40)
Build-out (S: 43, RR: 18)
Contract (S: 37.32, RR: 37.3
Litigate (S: 37.36, RR: 29)
Railroad choice Shipper choice
LAR
PMR
Figure 4: Aggressive Pricing
Event:     Equation:
(14) Shipper cost if LAR & litigate
(15) Shipper cost if PMR & litigate
(16) Railroad profit if LAR & litigate
(17) Railroad profit if PMR & litigate
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Figure 5 allows review of the railroad’s 
analysis of shipper reactions with a perceived 
arbitrary regulatory agency. In this case, 
the shipper litigates with either railroad rate 
strategy. However, the railroad has a better 
profit opportunity if it profit maximizes. In that 
case, the railroad believes it can earn a $35 
million profit if the shipper chooses its cheapest 
alternative, litigation.  In this case, the railroad 
believes it has the chance of reaping a windfall 
gain because it perceives that there is a possibility 
that the agency will decide in its favor despite 
the railroad’s imposing an exorbitant rate. 
Thus, an agency that is perceived as arbitrary 
increases the amount of litigation because both 
parties have expectations of windfall gains 
from litigation. 
CONCLUSION   
The model provides a tool to analyze the 
decisions of two parties in a railroad-shipper 
negotiation setting. The seller of services, in this 
case the railroad, aims to maximize its profits. 
The buyer, in this case the shipper, wants to 
minimize its costs. The railroad offers a rate 
and the shipper chooses to either accept the rate, 
build-out to gain competitive entry, or litigate at 
the regulatory agency. A few observations are 
pertinent after estimating the model.
Larger shipment sizes increase the value 
of a potential build-out so the parties have 
incentive to contract with larger shipment 
sizes.  The railroad wants to avoid competitive 
entry and the shipper gets to avoid unnecessary 
litigation. On the other hand, increasing the 
cost of a build-out increases the incentives for 
litigation.  Railroads have less competition to 
hold down rates and shippers with extremely 
limited competitive options are more likely to 
contest rates.
Finally, increased litigation is also the result 
of the model’s extension simulating the parties’ 
perception that the agency has become arbitrary 
rather than rational or fair.  Without a predictable 
result, the parties have more of an incentive to 
Figure 5:  Decision Tree When Regulatory Agency Perceived as Arbitrary
Build-out (S: 37, RR: 14)
Litigate (S: 27, RR: 20)
Contract (S: 40, RR: 40)
Build-out (S: 43, RR: 18)
Contract (S: 30, RR: 30)
Litigate (S: 39, RR: 35)
Railroad choice Shipper choice
LAR
PMR
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“roll the dice” on litigation rather than contract 
because they perceive an arbitrary agency may 
provide windfalls.  This is an important result 
that stresses the need for a regulatory agency 
to be more transparent and predictable in its 
results in order to reduce unnecessary litigation 
and encourage private sector solutions.
The model presented in this paper might be 
extended to analyze repeated games and mixed 
strategies.  This might be a better approach to 
analyzing the negotiating interaction between 
a railroad and a shipper.  A model of repeated 
interactions would not view the game as one 
play but a series of plays as the players negotiate 
contracts or litigate over several years and often 
for several different plants and coal mines.
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Appendix
To calculate the rate at which the shipper is indifferent to a build-out with a shipment of two  
million tons: From Equation (1):
0 12 500 000 12 500 000 1 10 10 1 10 2 002= + − −$ , , ($ , , / . ) (( ' $ ) /( . ) )* ,PMR 0 000 10 1 10
2 000 000 10 1 10
3
4
, (( ' $ ) /( . ) )*
, , (( ' $ ) /( . ) )
+ −
+ −
PMR
PMR * , ,2 000 000
PMR’ = $ 15.28, where PMR’ is the rate at which the shipper is indifferent to a build-out.
PMR is then:
0.95 * $15.28 = $14.51
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